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Introduction 
 
The regency of the duc d'Orléans is generally considered a period of relative calm in the 
French ancien régime. The contest of arms over the Spanish succession, which had spanned 
Europe and dragged on for more than a decade, ended in 1713-14 after Philip of Anjou agreed 
to renounce his rights to the French throne, thus preventing a potentially destabilizing 
dynastic union of France and Spain. The country gained time to both stabilize its internal 
political and economic situation, and to normalize its strained international relations1. The 
latter aspect implied a detente with the House of Habsburg, and - above all - the renunciation 
of France's expansionism, which had peaked under Louis XIV and had largely been to the 
detriment of the Habsburg Netherlands2. After a half century in which the Sun King's armies 
repeatedly crossed France's northern border, the installation of the regent appeared to signal 
an end to the country's expansionist ambitions with regard to the Southern Low Countries.  
 
 
1  Lucien BÉLY, Les relations internationales en Europe, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles, Paris, 20074, p. 447. 
2  Hervé HASQUIN, Louis XIV face à l'Europe du Nord: l'absolutisme vaincu par les libertés, Brussels, 2005, 
passim. 
The international positioning of la Régence, and particularly France's policy in relation to the 
Southern - and since 1713 Austrian – Netherlands, seems to constitute a firm break with that 
of previous decades. This apparent discontinuity raises many questions, such as what exactly 
caused France's reorientation and who was responsible for it, and yet the scientific literature 
does not provide satisfactory answers. Despite the Bourbons's historical interest in the region, 
a thorough, long-term analysis of French policy in relation to the Habsburg Netherlands is still 
lacking. Lucien Bély's overview article of 2013 provided the impetus for this research. In it, 
Bély states that post-Louis XIV France generally behaved as a territorially saturated power – 
“comme si les revendications anciennes de la France sur l'Artois et la Flandre ayant été 
satisfaites”3. Because it was protected by a well-defended pré carré, France no longer 
considered expansion to the north a necessity, and thus consciously renounced its earlier 
ambitions4. However, "post-Louis XIV" meant the government of Louis XV, and the political 
intermezzo of the regency is hardly mentioned in the article. Rather, it is implicitly assumed 
that changes under Louis XV had already gained momentum during la Régence. 
 
 
3  Lucien BÉLY, L'art de la paix en Europe. Naissance de la diplomatie moderne, XVIe-XVIIIe siècle, Paris, 
2007, p. 210. 
4  Lucien BÉLY, "Le royaume de France et les Pays-Bas à l'époque moderne," in Claude DE MOREAU DE 
GERBEHAYE, Sébastien DUBOIS and Jean-Marie YANTE, eds., Gouvernance et administration dans les Provinces 
Belgiques (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles). Ouvrage publié en hommage au professeur Claude Bruneel, Brussels, 2013, p. 
645. A similar line of argumentation was employed earlier by Michel Antoine and Jean-Pierre Bois. See Michel 
ANTOINE, Louis XV, Paris, 1989, p. 401; Jean-Pierre BOIS, Fontenoy 1745: Louis XV, arbitre de l'Europe, Paris, 1996, 
p. 129-33. 
This thesis - that French territorial ambitions in the Netherlands disappeared in the wake of 
what is interpreted as a peaceful turn in the country's general foreign policy - also fits within 
the historiographical discourse of some influential legal historians on emerging ideas 
regarding a European balance of power following the Peace of Utrecht. For example, authors 
such as Randall Lesaffer and Frederik Dhondt state that the eighteenth century was a 
breeding ground for politicians and theorists who emphasized the importance of establishing 
political equilibrium in Europe. As Lesaffer has demonstrated, this principle was included both 
explicitly and implicitly in the various treaty texts formulated in April and July 1713. 
Additionally, Dhondt argues that France and England, Europe's premier diplomatic mediators 
following Utrecht, engaged in political actions that increasingly corresponded with the 
normative principle of maintaining a balance of power5. Others, like James Sofka, contend 
that this quest for equilibrium was not much more than a myth, and that governments and 
rulers remained expansionist and hegemonic; the difference was that they now simply lacked 
the means to realize their ambitions6. 
 
 
5  Randall LESAFFER, The Peace of Utrecht, the Balance of Power and the Law of Nations, Tilburg Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series 05/2014, in 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384467, passim (consultation date 4 February 2020); 
Frederik DHONDT, Balance of power and norm hierarchy: Franco-British diplomacy after the Peace of Utrecht, 
Leiden-Boston, 2015, p. 344-70. 
6  James R. SOFKA, "The eighteenth century international system", in Review of International Studies, 27, 
2001, p. 148-49. 
Did emergent theories about a European balance of power effectively lead to this peaceful 
period in the otherwise conflict-ridden ancien régime? Was the cautious foreign policy of la 
Régence a sincere expression of peaceful intent? Or was France's position actually a result of 
pragmatic self-restraint? After all, the government in Paris was well aware that any attempt 
at territorial expansion would inevitably lead to a military response from an extensive anti-
French coalition. The whys and wherefores of this new direction in French foreign policy 
require examination in relation to the latter perspective - especially when we take into 
account later developments such as French intervention in the Habsburg Netherlands during 
the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) or the plans drafted in 1756 to pass the 
territory on to the duke of Parma, Louis XV's son-in-law, via an exchange. Not to mention the 
outright annexation of the Austrian Netherlands by France at the end of the eighteenth 
century. It must therefore be asked whether 1714 France really was "une nation satisfaite"? 
The position taken during la Régence must be analysed against the backdrop of both 
circumstance and other ideas that may have been either prevalent or circulating on the 
margins of French political circles; in other words, the opinions, options, and alternatives 
mooted that may not have been consistent with either the official discourse of peace or with 
the realities of French foreign policy. 
 
This question forms the starting point of an analysis of French priorities and motives 
concerning the Austrian Netherlands between 1715 and 1723. In this article, we will examine 
the policies carried out in relation to the Southern Netherlands, and at the same time analyse 
to what extent this was in accordance with the wishes and ambitions expressed in French 
government circles. Was there a hunger in Paris, contrary to the official discourse, for 
territorial expansion to the north - “la réalisation d'un rêve impossible”7 - or was that simply, 
once and for all, no longer the order of the day? And how was France's attitude perceived in 
the Austrian Netherlands? Were people there convinced that the apparent rapprochement 
was sincere, or were there still concerns about an invasion? Was this uniform throughout the 
population, or were there factions with differing views regarding a possible French 
annexation?  
 
For this analysis, we have used the Correspondance politique, Pays-Bas Espagnols et 
Autrichiens8, which is a compilation of exchanges between the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and its diplomats and agents active abroad - in this case, in the Austrian Netherlands. 
However, the collection contains much more than the directives and regular communiques 
between Brussels and Paris. It also includes the continually generated memoranda and policy 
reflection papers, which reveal the range of ideas circulating in French diplomatic circles. 
These sources offer us an insight into the other options and alternative or additional goals 
that were being discussed in Paris.  
 
This analysis and its conclusions will fill in a major lacuna in the literature because it will enable 
us to better evaluate the regency of Philip d'Orléans, who was long considered a weaker ruler 
than his predecessors. This less than nuanced view of the regent has already undergone some 
 
7  BÉLY, "Le royaume de France et les Pays-Bas," p. 647. 
8  Paris - La Courneuve, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes (AMAE), 
Correspondance politique (CP), Pays-Bas Espagnols et Autrichiens (PBEA), vol. 67-90 (1713-24). 
revision, in part thanks to two recent monographs by the French historian Alexandre Dupilet, 
but which primarily focus on domestic politics9.  
 
Post-Utrecht Normalisation 
 
Shortly after the War of the Spanish Succession, in the final phase of his long reign, Louis XIV 
insisted on the normalization of political relations with the Roman Emperor. An important 
instrument in the restoration of Franco-Austrian relations was the reestablishment of 
France's permanent diplomatic representation at the Habsburg court. That is why Charles-
François de Vintimille, comte du Luc, was sent to Vienna as ambassador in January 1715. In 
the Austrian Netherlands, which was of evident political, economic and military interest to 
France, Paris was represented by Léandre de Rossi-Leoni, the marquis de Rossi. In December 
1714 he was sent to Brussels as chargé d'affaires and he remained there until his death in 
1726. A native of Perugia, he had served both Louis XIV and Philip V since 1702; among other 
assignments, he had been employed during the Utrecht negotiations, and he headed up an 
extensive espionage network10. These experiences served him well in the Austrian 
Netherlands, where he also had access to a great many informants.  
 
 
9 Alexandre DUPILET, Le Cardinal Dubois: le génie politique de la Régence, Paris, 2015; Alexandre DUPILET, 
La Régence absolue: Philippe d'Orléans et la polysynodie, 1715-1718, Seyssell, 2011. 
10  Lucien BÉLY, Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV, Paris, 2007, p. 56-58; Bruno DEMOULIN, "La 
France et les Pays-Bas autrichiens à l'aube du XVIIIe siècle", in Bulletin de la Commission Royale d'Histoire, 175 
(2009), p. 542. 
The instructions Rossi received from the French State Secretary for Foreign Affairs (secrétaire 
d’Etat des affaires étrangères), Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Torcy, were in line with France's 
reconciliation efforts with Vienna. During 1715, discussion of the restoration of the “bonne 
intelligence” - a term that often appears in diplomatic correspondence - repeatedly appeared 
in the letters exchanged between Rossi and Torcy. In order to rebuild this “good 
understanding” between France and Austria, Rossi was to direct his attention towards the 
Austrian minister plenipotentiary, Count Joseph von Königsegg, who was the de facto 
replacement for the ever-absent governor, Eugène de Savoie11. According to Rossi, Königsegg 
appeared very receptive to French overtures, but the Austrian authorities in Brussels and 
Vienna - just like those in The Hague and London - generally continued to harbour suspicions 
regarding Bourbon intentions. Their scepticism was not entirely unjustified, as Torcy's letters 
to Rossi demonstrate that despite the peaceable discourse sometimes employed, the 
ambition to gain control of the Southern Netherlands remained. For example, in March 1715, 
Torcy wrote “je ne doute pas que le desir de voir quelque jour les Paysbas unis à la France, 
n’augmente dans la suite des temps, mais Sa Majesté veut conserver en paix les grands Etats 
que Dieu luy a donnez sans songer à les augmenter”12. 
 
Rossi's activities in Brussels were informed by this point of view. He regularly reported on 
opinions in the Austrian Netherlands with regard to France in general as well as to any future 
French annexation - not all of which were negative. During the region's transfer to Austrian 
rule, not all Southern Netherlanders had been pro-Habsburg. Philip of Anjou also had a small 
 
11  Torcy to Rossi, Versailles, 11 April 1715, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 68, f. 220v.  
12  Torcy to Rossi, Versailles, 28 March 1715, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 68, f. 200r.  
but influential following, as did the Elector of Bavaria, who had held sovereignty over the 
disputed region between 1711 and 171413. In addition, Rossi frequently wrote about the 
activities of a group of French-minded inhabitants who often expressed their loyalty to the 
Bourbon dynasty. The existence of these pro-French sentiments in the Southern Netherlands 
was to a large extent the result of the strategy Louis XIV had developed since his marriage to 
Maria Theresa in order to strengthen the personal ties between the Flemish elites and France, 
among other things by means of a well-considered marriage policy and the subsequent 
integration of the French and Flemish nobility. At the same time, by threats and intimidation, 
but also by granting political and economic favours and offering protection, Louis XIV had also 
succeeded in spreading the conviction that France was the only power that could actually 
safeguard the social, political and especially patrimonial interests of the aristocracy of the 
Southern Netherlands, much more than the powerless Spanish Habsburgs or other European 
states could. When the Spanish succession came to the table, a seizure of power by the 
Bourbon dynasty was by some aristocratic families of the Habsburg Netherlands, as well as 
by parts of the trading bourgeoisie, certainly seen as a suitable means of getting out of the 
eternal impasse and safeguarding their interests in the longer term14. It is difficult to 
determine exactly how many pro-Bourbon Southern Netherlanders there were, but the fact 
that Rossi pays so much attention to them is nevertheless revealing. Torcy therefore ordered 
Rossi to maintain good relations with these pro-French individuals while taking care not to 
 
13  See Klaas VAN GELDER, Regime change at a distance: Austria and the Southern Netherlands following the 
war of the Spanish succession, 1716-1725, Louvain, 2016, p. 205-12. 
14  Thomas GLESENER, L'empire des exilés. Les Flamands et le gouvernement de l'Espagne au XVIIIe siècle, 
Madrid, 2017, p. 19-67. 
upset the authorities in Brussels15. And his contacts with this community were clearly 
excellent because in April 1716 Rossi even married a cousin of the Count of Bergeyck, one of 
the most influential politicians in Brussels, who had always promoted a good rapport with 
Versailles during the Anjouan regime16. 
 
The Start of la Régence  
 
In September 1715, Philip d'Orléans became regent and Marshal d'Huxelles became president 
of the Council of Foreign Affairs, and Rossi was soon cautioned to behave more circumspectly. 
Although the diplomat continued to report on pro-French sentiments, with or without 
exaggeration, d'Huxelles was initially much more reserved than his predecessor, Torcy, in his 
reflections on the value of this information; according to him, “l'interest de Sa Majesté etant 
… de ne rien faire qui puisse être contraire en quelque manière que ce soit à la bonne 
intelligence”17. Rossi was even to avoid critics of the Austrian administration as much as 
possible18. 
 
Paris's - albeit temporary - reticence must be viewed in light of the inextricably linked contexts 
of both the regent's precarious domestic situation and his international isolation during the 
early months of his government. When he took office, d'Orléans could not count on 
widespread support in court circles; the largely Anjouan-minded aristocracy, who held seats 
 
15  Torcy to Rossi, Versailles, 11 April 1715, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 68, f. 223r.  
16  VAN GELDER, Regime change at a distance, p. 91-94. 
17  D’Huxelles to Rossi, Paris, 3 August 1716, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 72, f. 23v-24r.  
18  D’Huxelles to Rossi, Paris, 8 December 1715, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 70, f. 141r-142v.  
in various polysynodic councils, had a major influence on foreign policy19. While the 
polysynodal system created by the regent initially seemed an ideal way to exercise control 
over the recalcitrant aristocracy, it eventually proved inefficient and was abolished. Leading 
nobles, with d'Huxelles at their fore, were still in favour of a Bourbon alliance with Spain at 
the end of 1715, and they also gave financial support to the Catholic pretender to the English 
throne, James Stuart, who threatened the authority of George I. 
 
However, d'Huxelles's anti-British attitude turned out to be counterproductive, as other 
European superpowers concluded a number of treaties between the end of 1715 and the 
summer of 1716, which caused the regent to become yet more isolated. Philip V of Spain 
signed a bilateral trade agreement with England in December 1715. In turn, George I 
concluded treaties with the Republic in February 1716 and with Charles VI four months later, 
after the Roman Emperor had tried in vain to renew the Grand Alliance of the War of the 
Spanish Succession. The latter treaty caused d'Huxelles to worry once again about the 
Habsburgs, and that is why he commissioned the marquis de Châteauneuf, the French 
ambassador in The Hague, to propose a treaty with the Republic that would guarantee the 
neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands. Brussels saw this as an act of desperation on the part 
of an isolated and fearful France seeking to protect its weak, northern border20. 
 
In June 1716, the regent finally rejected the isolationism of his Anjouan-minded court and 
sought diplomatic rapprochement with George I, who had concluded bilateral treaties with 
 
19  DUPILET, La Régence absolue, p. 13. 
20  Rossi to d’Huxelles, Brussels, 10 January 1716, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 70, f. 187r-191r. 
just about every other European superpower. This policy shift had been promoted for months 
by Guillaume Dubois - Philip d'Orléans's former tutor - who gradually worked his way up to 
secrétaire d’Etat des affaires étrangères and later became cardinal and first minister of 
France. This jurist homo novus, who was concerned with Realpolitik more than dynastic 
prestige21, was responsible for the Anglo-French treaty concluded on November 28, 1716, 
after tense negotiations and by means of substantial concessions from France22. This English-
French alliance, which would become the main diplomatic axis of Europe during the Trente 
Heureuses, marked Dubois's first major victory over the anti-British d'Huxelles and other 
members of the Anjouan vieille Cour. From that moment onwards, Dubois would play a crucial 
role in formulating French foreign policy, and soon thereafter he gained a seat in the Conseil 
des affaires étrangères, thus providing d'Huxelles with a serious political opponent. 
 
The Triple and Quadruple Alliances and Their Consequences  
 
In early 1717, the Republic joined the English-French alliance, creating a Triple Alliance 
between France and Austria's former allies. Habsburg uneasiness over this state of affairs was 
signalled in Vienna and Brussels. Even before the final signing, Rossi noticed that "les 
Imperiaux temoignent de chagrin au sujet des traittés"23. Among other things, this "chagrin" 
was expressed in the form of a particularly anti-French discourse. Concerns about the Triple 
Alliance intensified fear of Paris's territorial ambitions in the Austrian Netherlands, where 
 
21  DUPILET, Le Cardinal Dubois, 136. 
22  DHONDT, Balance of power and norm hierarchy, 77-83; Jeremy BLACK, From Louis XIV to Napoleon: the 
fate of a great power, London, 2001, p. 72. 
23  Rossi to d’Huxelles, Brussels, 16 October 1716, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 72, f. 108r-v.  
rumours were rife that France and the maritime powers were about to conquer the area and 
divvy it up. Rossi suspected that the marquis of Prié, Königsegg's successor as minister 
plenipotentiary, who was much more critical of France, was spreading these rumours in an 
attempt to suppress certain pro-French elements in the population24. 
 
The new international context created by the Triple Alliance also had an impact on 
negotiations regarding the border between France and the Austrian Netherlands, which took 
place in Lille under the auspices of the Peace of Utrecht. These talks were intended to settle 
some disputes of both military and commercial nature, but they were held in an increasingly 
tense and uncompromising atmosphere. In June 1717, less than two months after the 
inception of the Triple Alliance, an irate Charles VI recalled his ambassadors from Lille and the 
talks were broken off25. Austrian distrust and isolation thus had a direct effect on Franco-
Habsburg relations as they developed in Brussels and Lille. Another factor that heightened 
Vienna's apprehension, was Philip V of Spain's military aggression. Despite having lost his 
Italian possessions in Utrecht - Naples, Milan and Sardinia to Charles VI, and Sicily to the duke 
of Savoy - he continued to lay claim to them. Until the spring of 1718, France and England 
continued to try to reconcile the Spanish king and the emperor in the hope of avoiding a large-
scale conflict, but neither were willing to waive their territorial claims.  
 
 
24  Rossi to d’Huxelles, Brussels, 22 December 1716, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 72, f. 208r-209v.  
25  Tim DE BACKER, De Vrede van Utrecht, Rastadt en Baden en de Oostenrijkse Nederlanden (1713-1731), 
Louvain (Masters diss. Catholic University of Leuven), 2007, p. 105. 
Philip V's invasion of Sardinia in the July of 1717 and of Sicily a year later, and the emperor's 
fear of a Franco-Spanish alliance, led to talks regarding a four-way treaty between the 
maritime powers, France, and Austria, which resulted in the Quadruple Alliance. A great deal 
of work was invested in the agreement, but its signing in London on August 2, 1718, was met 
with anything but enthusiasm in Vienna, Brussels, and Paris. Together with his British 
counterpart, Minister Stanhope, Dubois had laid out a path to diplomatic reconciliation with 
Austria, but d'Huxelles and the Anjouan vieille Cour remained committed to supporting the 
Spanish king's territorial claims in Italy26. It was not until the end of 1718 that the regent was 
able to put an end to the roiling power struggle between the French court's two political 
factions. 
 
Elsewhere, in the period between Philip's invasion of Sardinia and the ratification of the 
Quadruple Alliance, rumours grew of a French-Spanish alliance. In Brussels's governmental 
circles this was accompanied by the fear that France would use a war against the emperor as 
an opportunity to seize the Austrian Netherlands27, and even that Philip V was preparing for 
a Spanish invasion, which the dissatisfied inhabitants - some of which were Anjouan 
sympathizers - would perhaps support28. An additional factor that encouraged mistrust 
among the Austrian officials in Brussels were some incidents of urban unrest in the spring of 
 
26  DUPILET, Le Cardinal Dubois, p. 157. 
27  Rossi to d’Huxelles, Brussels, 21 December 1717, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 76, f. 159v-160r. 
28  Rossi to d’Huxelles, Brussels, 11 May 1718, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 78, f. 195r-199r. 
171829. In short, the new regime not only had to fear their southern neighbour, but it was 
also threatened by some of its own subjects.  
 
Brussels's wariness does not appear entirely unfounded if one takes into account Rossi's 
interest in both the pro-French and anti-Habsburg sentiments in the Austrian Netherlands. As 
time went on, Rossi reported on this matter more frequently, and with growing exuberance. 
He constantly underlined the fragility of the emperor's authority and Southern Netherlandish 
discontent, which, together with pro-French sentiments, he felt would be to France's 
advantage if war broke out over Italy. Even after the emperor approved the Quadruple 
Alliance in April 1718, Rossi remained enthusiastic about the fact that members of the local 
nobility continued to hope that Spain would not accept the agreement reached on Italy, and 
that a conflict could still lead to a Bourbon take over. And Paris was clearly becoming more 
enthusiastic too. While Rossi's reports had been met with a reserved attitude early in the 
regency, d'Huxelles now explicitly asked the diplomat to keep an eye on the evolution of 
opinions about the emperor's rule in the Austrian Netherlands, and on pro-French 
sympathizers30. So even though there was an official Franco-Austrian alliance that 
theoretically eliminated the French threat to the Austrian Netherlands by prohibiting 
offensive actions, this just meant that no concrete plans for annexation were discussed in the 
diplomatic correspondence between Paris and the chargé d'affaires in Brussels.  Annexation 
under the cover of a wider conflict, however, remained a possible option.  
 
 
29  VAN GELDER, Regime change at a distance, p. 238-42. 
30  D’Huxelles to Rossi, Paris, 7 May 1717, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 75, f. 220r. 
Yet one objective outweighed all others in 1718: achieving some kind of stability. This was 
more important than French expansionism, Austrian mistrust or the longstanding Bourbon-
Habsburg feud. Most European superpowers were still in military and economic recovery 
from the War of the Spanish Succession, and more than anything else they wanted to avoid a 
new European-wide conflict. This was also the case in France, but the government's choice 
was not the result of external considerations, regardless of the discourse peddled by the 
regent and his new confident, Dubois. Rather, factors such as the lack of sufficient financial 
resources, the realities of international politics at the time and the internal power struggle at 
the French court were responsible for France's peaceful international stance, which in turn 
led to the Triple and Quadruple Alliances. In order to further solidify this state of affairs, 
Stanhope and Dubois continued to try to bring Philip V into the fold right up until the 
declaration of war at the end of 1718. 
 
Rising Tensions between Brussels and Paris (1718-1721) 
 
In the autumn of 1718, in the run-up to the war of the Quadruple Alliance, la Régence entered 
a new stage, which Alexandre Dupilet called the "authoritarian phase"31. In September, the 
regent abolished the polysynody following the fierce opposition to the Quadruple Alliance 
carried out by d'Huxelles and other influential members of the French nobility. That so many 
members of the seven central governmental councils wanted France to unite with Spain in a 
war against their hereditary Habsburg enemy sent a very bad message to the regent's brand-
new allies, George I and Charles VI. Philip d'Orléans did not need his foreign policy 
 
31  DUPILET, La Régence absolue, p. 331-32. 
undermined at home, and so the recalcitrant conseils were replaced with a set of loyal 
secétaires d’Etat, including the pragmatic Dubois, who became responsible for international 
affairs and thus gained even more influence on French foreign policy. As the architect of the 
recently concluded treaties, he was charged with maintaining those fragile alliances, and was 
thereby responsible for preserving stability in Europe - albeit in vain. 
 
At the end of 1718, the terms of the Quadruple Alliance meant that France, however 
reluctantly, would have to follow England in declaring war against Spain. Philip V and his chief 
minister, Cardinal Alberoni, persisted in their ambition to retake the Italian territories by 
force, despite numerous reconciliation attempts on the part of both England and France. Then 
the Cellamare conspiracy was uncovered in Paris in December 171832, and this provided the 
ideal excuse for Dubois to declare war on Spain on January 9, 1719. France sent troops to the 
Basque districts and Catalonia, and British and Imperial troops successfully fought the Spanish 
army in Italy. The war lasted until February 1720, when Philip V had to admit his crushing 
defeat and officially joined the Quadruple Alliance. This was of course a victory for the allies, 
but it was even more so for the durable diplomatic alliance system that had been constructed 
by the Franco-British tag team of Dubois and Stanhope. 
 
But despite the reconciliatory discourse of Dubois and the Franco-Austrian axis of the 
Quadruple Alliance between 1718 and 1720, the mutual mistrust between Paris and Brussels 
 
32  This failed conspiracy, named after the Spanish ambassador in Paris, was led by Cardinal Alberoni and 
a few domestic enemies of the duc d'Orléans, and their intent was to take the regent prisoner, and install Philip 
V in his place.  
persisted, and even grew. The Habsburg side feared France's military and financial recovery - 
now that the country had dug itself out of the hole caused by the War of the Spanish 
Succession, it was in an increasingly strong diplomatic and military position. Both Prié in 
Brussels and Austria's ambassador in Paris, Pendterriedter, wrote of their fear of French 
covetousness with regard to the Austrian Netherlands33. In the Netherlands, rumours 
constantly circulated that France was making military preparations at the border and some 
Austrian officers in Brussels were convinced that “la première guerre que l’Empereur aura 
sera contre la France”34. And indeed, Quadruple Alliance or not, France's interest in the 
Austrian Netherlands never completely disappeared. Rossi continued to report on and rejoice 
in the pro-Bourbon sentiments expressed in Brussels and on the population's dissatisfaction 
with the Austrian. Meanwhile, from Paris Dubois continued to emphasize the importance of 
a “bonne intelligence” between the regent and the emperor, and the two states did remain 
treaty partners. Therefore, the start of the "authoritarian phase" of la Régence did not bring 
about a profound change in France's cautious policy towards its northern neighbour, which is 
not surprising given the international diplomatic situation at that time. 
 
It is also worth considering that mistrust worked both ways; there were developments in the 
Austrian Netherlands that increasingly worried Paris. For example, France eyed the 
commercial expansion of Ostend with suspicion - and some unease. For several years, various 
entrepreneurs attempted to initiate trading expeditions from the port, and French traders 
 
33  Prié to Pendterriedter, Brussels, 2 March 1720, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 83, f. 22v-23r.; Pendterriedter to Prié, 
Paris, 30 December 1719, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 82, f. 205r-208v. 
34  Rossi to Dubois, Brussel, 22 December 1719, AMAE, CP, PBEA, 80, f. 201v. 
were also very interested in doing so, much to the dismay of Paris. Godefroy de la Merveille, 
an experienced captain from Saint-Malo, was one of the first to depart from Ostend for the 
East Indies in the spring of 171835. France, however, was by no means the only major 
European state concerned about the commercial activities in Ostend. More importantly, the 
two maritime powers - England and the Republic - were explicit in their dissatisfaction, which 
did not ease with the passage of time. On the contrary, the establishment of the Generale 
Keizerlijke en Koninklijke Indische Compagnie - the Ostend Company for short - in 1722, was 
met with vociferous protest in various European capitals. Under the terms of the Quadruple 
Alliance such a trading company was not yet permissible, although there had been 
increasingly frequent rumours about such plans. As a result, Rossi occasionally sent a secret 
envoy, the French merchant Du Coudray, to Ostend starting in 1718 with orders to monitor 
the commercial (and military) developments in the port, and he was permanently stationed 
there from July 1720 onwards36. Another major source of irritation were some of the new 
customs offices that the Austrian regime erected on the Franco-Luxembourg border. These 
monitored important trade routes connecting France with Liège, the Republic, and states in 
the Holy Roman Empire. Rossi had unsuccessfully appealed against these customs posts to 
Prié several times, after which Dubois threatened to set up customs posts on the French side 
of the border in October 171937. 
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While tensions between Paris and Brussels had gradually increased during the War of the 
Quadruple Alliance in 1718-1720, a French-Spanish detente arose. After months of lobbying 
at the Spanish court, a Franco-Spanish alliance was signed into existence in Madrid on March 
27, 1721. This agreement was reinforced in the traditional way: a double marriage between 
Louis XV and the infanta Maria Anna Victoria, and the regent's daughter Louise-Elisabeth and 
the eldest son of the Spanish king38. And shortly afterwards, on June 13, 1721, England also 
acceded to the treaty in consequence of the strong Franco-British diplomatic partnership that 
had formed during La Régence. But as a result of these diplomatic manoeuvres, Charles VI 
threatened to become isolated, and a marked imbalance arose between the House of 
Habsburg and the French alliance complex with European superpowers from northern and 
southern Europe. This asymmetry, in combination with the border and trade disputes, led to 
increasing fears of French aggression in the Austrian Netherlands, and contributed to the 
plummeting state of diplomatic relations. Prié had already expressed his concerns about 
French territorial ambitions a year earlier in great detail - or so Vienna and Brussels perceived 
it - in a letter to Pendterriedter, in which he wrote that the French-Austrian “bonne 
intelligence que des interets forts accidentels ont cimenté” 39, would soon cease, despite the 
pro-peace discourse that Dubois continued to employ. 
 
Because of its looming diplomatic - and possibly military - isolation in Europe, the Austrian 
administration in the Netherlands began to take steps to protect itself against France. For 
example, when rumours of a French-Spanish alliance spread during 1720, Prié introduced 
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extremely rigorous protectionist measures. He did so under the pretext of safeguarding the 
Habsburg Netherlands from an epidemic that was ravaging Provence at the time, but which 
never even reached the northern regions of France40. What Prié wanted was to establish a 
defensive line from Namur to Ostend that would subject French traders who wanted to enter 
the Austrian Netherlands to strict controls - whether they moved their goods overland or via 
the port of Ostend41. These measures were detrimental to French trade and Dubois dropped 
his reconciliation discourse. He resorted to economic reprisals by applying similar regulations 
to merchants from the Austrian Netherlands42. According to Rossi, this ultimately led to a 
relaxation of Prié's protectionism in the Netherlands. However, when the threefold alliance 
between France, England, and Spain was settled in the summer of 1721, the restrictions in 
the Austrian Netherlands were again tightened up43. Franco-Austrian relations had reached a 
new low, partly due to the international context; disputes were no longer resolved entirely 
via diplomatic consultation, and bilateral economic sanctions were put in place.   
 
Old Ambitions Never Fade Away (1721-1723) 
 
Thus at the end of la Régence, Austria once again considered France a genuine military threat, 
which led the Austrian regime to pay a great deal more attention to the defence of the 
southern border. Moreover, Vienna and Brussels were not the only ones on their guard, the 
government in The Hague was also very vigilant. For example, the Republic made numerous 
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repairs to the barrier fortifications from 1722 onwards. But was the purported French threat 
real, and the distrust justified? 
 
While France's territorial ambitions were discussed more explicitly in 1722, it is important to 
frame these ambitions - and the increasing Franco-Austrian tension over the Southern 
Netherlands - within the contemporary international political context, in which there was the 
real possibility of a new European-wide war. Distrust between Austria and Spain ran deep, 
which was demonstrated, among other things, by the unpromising start of the Cambrai peace 
congress (1722-1725) that followed the War of the Quadruple Alliance. This was intended to 
reach a definitive agreement between Charles VI and Philip V, but the government in the 
Southern Netherlands had very low expectations considering Austria's much weaker 
international position in relation to the French-Spanish bloc. Meanwhile, the Bourbon 
rapprochement was confirmed yet again in the summer of 1722 with an additional French-
Spanish wedding, this time of Philip V's son Don Carlos (the later Carlos III) with Philippine-
Élisabeth, one of the Regent's daughters. Vienna viewed this as a direct provocation, and 
Pendterriedter, a member of the Austrian delegation in Cambrai and formerly the Imperial 
ambassador in Paris, responded to the news with the tell-tale words “Hé bien, vive la 
guerre!”44. In fact, actual peace negotiations did not begin until 1724 - after the reign of 
d'Orléans ended45. 
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France following la Régence was in a totally different international position than when the 
regent came to power in 1715. The strategist Dubois, who had been made cardinal and then 
First Minister in August 1722, had anchored the regime in solid alliances. This meant that the 
diplomatic caution exhibited during the early years of la Régence was no longer necessary, 
and thus France's territorial ambitions were expressed more openly - at least by the French 
envoys in the Austrian Netherlands. Moreover, the prospect of a new Franco-Austrian conflict 
gave rise to reflection on France's options with regard to the Southern Netherlands. Both 
Rossi and his representative in Ostend, Du Coudray, saw a conflict as the ideal opportunity to 
finally gain control of the Southern Netherlands. In 1722, Dubois asked Rossi to draw up a 
detailed survey of the troops in the Austrian Netherlands and the general state of affairs -  
according to the cardinal this was just as a precaution in order to gauge Austria's intentions. 
However, the chargé d'affaires produced an eighty-page letter that went far beyond a mere 
description of the military defensive capability of the Austrian Netherlands46. After an 
extensive discussion of the inhabitants' dissatisfaction, the persistence of pro-French 
sentiments among certain groups, and their possible uses in a conflict, Rossi went on to lay 
out a plan for military invasion, “une idée que j'ay formée aprez de meures reflexions, pour 
se rendre maistre de ces pays cy sans beaucoup de peine”47. 
 
In direct contrast with the vague talk of retaking the Southern Netherlands that he 
occasionally expressed during the first years of la Régence, Rossi now made explicit proposals 
to quickly and effectively overpower the region. Shortly afterwards, his secret envoy, Du 
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Coudray, produced a detailed plan for conquest via the port of Ostend48. In December 1722, 
the foundation of the Ostend Company was swiftly met with stiff international opposition, 
primarily on the part of England and the Republic. France was also less than pleased to see 
maritime economic competition so close to its border, but Dubois ordered his envoys in the 
Netherlands not to take a strong stance against the new company. In addition to Dubois's 
official French discourse of peace and reconciliation, there were other motivations for 
appearing impartial according to Du Coudray. He realized that France, facing the prospect of 
a war and annexation of the Austrian Netherlands, had every interest in keeping the Southern 
Netherlandish merchant classes on its side, while letting the maritime powers - who were far 
from popular - take the lead in opposing the Ostend Company49. 
 
The sources clearly demonstrate how expansionism had resurfaced in French diplomatic 
circles in 1722-1723, and that it was no longer limited to an "offensive defense", in other 
words the argument that if France were to take military action in the Netherlands it would be 
purely to defend the pré carré against a Habsburg threat from the north. Rather, the plans 
outlined above, and the views expressed by agents of the French Crown, undercut the views 
of several historians that post-Louis XIV France had definitively eschewed its expansionist 
ambitions with regard to Southern Netherlands - at least as far as the period of la Régence is 
concerned. Certainly, there can be no doubt that Rossi and Du Coudray were considering how 
to achieve permanent territorial gains. 
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 In December 1722, and again eyeing the prospect of a renewed military conflict with Austria, 
Du Coudray presented Rossi with a “Projet d’un manifeste qui doit estre repandu dans le 
Paysbas Autrichien”50. In it, the agent discussed how after the hoped-for invasion, France had 
to produce a manifesto stating that it had always regarded the inhabitants of the Austrian 
Netherlands to be French subjects, and he also indicated what other flatteries could induce 
the inhabitants to accept an annexation. Rossi also pondered “la manière de les gouverner”51, 
and concluded that in order to permanently capture the hearts and minds of the Southern 
Netherlanders, France should safeguard urban privileges. The repeated and emphatic pleas 
for an invasion of the Austrian Netherlands and its annexation by Rossi and Du Coudray, 
indicate that territorial ambition was not limited to agents abroad. Rather, these examples 
and other reflections contained in the French correspondence suggest that the central 
government in Paris were amenable to the idea.   
 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the outspokenness of diplomats such as Rossi and Du Coudray, 
First Minister Dubois, who always had to bear in mind the broader picture when drafting 
foreign policy, exhibited a more nuanced attitude. For example, Dubois was entirely 
convinced of the support for France among parts of the Southern Netherlandish elite; in 1723 
he even told Rossi that “c’est un avantage et une chose agréable que de pouvoir estre 
convaincu qu’à la premiere occasion on peut compter non seulement sur leurs concours à se 
donner un nouveau maitre, mais encore sur leur constance à demeurer sous la Domination 
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du Roi s’ils y estoient une fois passés”52. And yet unlike Rossi or Du Coudray, he did not 
consider these pro-French elements of immediate use in the nearby future; given that, at that 
moment, maintaining Europe's peace was his primary concern, he was less enthusiastic than 
the French envoys in the Austrian Netherlands when it came to ambitious military discourse. 
 
However, Dubois's relatively constant and unambiguous discourse promoting a European 
balance of power or a general peace needs closer examination. Naturally, considerations 
about the balance of power on the part of the juridically trained Dubois have been given a 
great deal of attention by historians, and his correspondence is peppered with references to 
the tranquillité générale in Europe53. This desire to preserve the peace and spare France a 
new war was, moreover, the only motive that Dubois explicitly mentioned in his letters to 
Rossi. As such, it is unlikely that this was nothing more than a mere figure of speech, as Sofka 
has argued with regard to the use of this discourse by states and governments during the 
eighteenth century when discussing their international political motivations54. At the same 
time, more pragmatic and Realpolitik motives also played their part in post-Utrecht France 
and the stance that la Régence seemed to be taking at the international level.  
 
In the first phase of la Régence, Philip faced fierce domestic opposition, an exhausted state 
treasury, and an anti-French international climate. All had helped to ensure that the regent 
could not pursue an ambitious foreign policy; however, other factors and motives were at 
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play during the later years of the regency. The miserable state of the government's finances 
remained a constant point of concern, but now, maintaining the system of strategic alliances 
that Dubois had so carefully constructed during Philip's regency became a priority. Any 
dynastic prestige or military glory that could accrue from the annexation of the Austrian 
Netherlands, was subordinate to Dubois's business of preserving peace in the French 
kingdom, which was inextricably and inevitably linked to ensuring general peace in Europe. 
Dubois provided a frank justification for this pragmatic pacifism when he informed Rossi that 
“il est des momens ou les affaires principales ne permettent pas d’agiter celles qui peuvent 
estre regardées comme subordonnées"55. For Dubois, these "affaires principales" consisted 
of two things: the preservation of the general peace and - despite diplomatic tensions - 
establishing an amicable relationship with the emperor. Both would ensure the much-needed 
domestic tranquillity in France, and even after Dubois' death in August 1723, these two 
considerations formed the basis of French foreign policy for years to come. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is undoubtedly true that the Treaty of Utrecht ushered in a new phase in French foreign 
policy. The international political position of la Régence was a break with the almost 
continuous wars the country experienced under Louis XIII and Louis XIV. In an apparent about 
face, France actively worked to build alliances, it avoided being drawn into wars by the 
Bourbon king of Spain, and - above all - it became known as "une nation satisfaite" that was 
no longer interested in expanding its borders. Nevertheless, the above analysis has shown 
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that France's policy formation was less clear cut than its official discourse. Torcy emphasized 
the importance of "une bonne intelligence" with Austria, but he surreptitiously indicated that 
he was open to the possibility of annexing the Habsburg Netherlands at some point in the 
future. His successor, d'Huxelles, showed himself more cautious at the start of the regency 
because d'Orléans's position was by no means domestically secure, and moreover because 
France was also isolated internationally as a result of taking a persistently anti-British stance. 
Later, however, he too was intensely interested in pro-French sentiments among the 
Southern Netherlandish elites. 
 
Yet the figure who had the greatest impact on France's foreign policy both during and after 
la Régence was, of course, Dubois. Under his watch in the summer of 1716, the regent sought 
a diplomatic rapprochement with George I. The Anglo-French alliance that resulted then came 
to form the basis of a broader European coalition, which gradually gave France more space in 
which to manoeuvre internationally. In Vienna and Brussels, this caused renewed anxieties 
regarding a possible French invasion and annexation of the Southern Netherlands. When 
Philip V pressed his claims to Italian territories by force of arms, Austria feared that this was 
the harbinger of Franco-Spanish military actions against the House of Habsburg. These shifts 
in international relations caused Rossi and Du Coudray to enthusiastically report on the 
support that the Bourbons enjoyed in the Southern Netherlands, and they were also quite 
explicit in making the case for French annexation. Border and trade disputes put even more 
pressure on the already strained relationship between France and Austria. Finally, in 1722, 
the French envoys in the Austrian Netherlands drew up bold offensive plans that left little to 
the imagination. 
 
While the reports and opinions of a chargé d'affaires and his colleague obviously do not 
constitute definitive proof that expansionist urges remained widespread throughout French 
political circles, it is also difficult to find out exactly how common such notions were at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. At the very least, it is clear from the correspondence of 
Rossi and Du Coudray that an urge to annex the Southern Netherlands was alive and well 
among French diplomats. Moreover, it is obviously the case that some parts of the French 
aristocracy continued to harbour violent hostility towards the House of Habsburg, and even 
with Dubois there are subtle indications that he was not wholly opposed to the proposition.  
As such, Rossi and Du Coudray were probably not isolated in their ambitions. 
 
But Dubois had to carefully delineate France's priorities when it came to foreign policy. The 
territorial desires of Rossi and Du Coudray - which it can be surmised were held by others as 
well - had to be considered in relation to the country's greater interests. Dubois connected 
the tranquillity of France with the tranquillity of Europe in general, and this is in line with his 
discourse regarding the desire for a balance of power in Europe as a surety for harmonious 
coexistence. Nevertheless, his choices were probably also motivated by the realization that 
French military aggression, against the Austrian Netherlands for example, would certainly be 
seen as a provocation by many countries, resulting in a pan-European coalition against France 
that would in turn be based on the very same discourse on the maintenance of a balance of 
power. Thus Dubois linked the theoretical considerations about European equilibrium to 
France's concrete interests, and weighed his options according to the circumstances of the 
time. 
 
At first glance, Philip d'Orléans's pro-peace regime might seem weaker than that of his 
aggressive predecessors, but in reality, this policy proved both coherent and farsighted. Risky 
and expensive territorial ambitions were set aside and sustainable, durable alliances were 
forged with former enemies. This led to a quarter of a century peace for the kingdom of 
France. By balancing national interests within a framework of pan-European stability, the 
regent and Cardinal Dubois in particular, proved to be strategically driven statesmen who 
acted with reference to a long-term vision. The price that had to be paid for this was the 
definitive renunciation of "le rêve impossible". At least, that was what Paris wanted other 
European capitals to believe. 
 
This policy was a temporary positioning in function of the fluctuating political situation. 
France had cherished the ambition to annex the Southern Netherlands since the late Middle 
Ages and had striven to do so with all its might, especially during the second half of the 
seventeenth century. That it had not quite given up hope of achieving this goal was borne out 
during the War of the Austrian Succession, when after a brief wait, France overran the 
Austrian Netherlands in 1744, and implemented concrete measures to definitively annex 
parts of the counties of Hainault and Flanders56. The 1748 Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle 
ultimately reversed this situation, but Paris continued to cast its eyes to the north. Two years 
after the successful annexation of the Southern Netherlands in 1795, in the Peace of Campo-
Formio, Emperor Francis II renounced "all his rights and titles over the former Belgian 
provinces known as the Austrian Netherlands", ceding them to France. The treaty stated that 
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"the French Republic shall possess these countries in perpetuity, with total sovereignty and 
proprietorship, and with all the territorial advantages dependent thereon"57. This was 
everything Rossi and Du Coudray had hoped for. It seemed that the impossible dream had 
finally come true. 
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